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FEDERAL PROCEDURE
WHAT OF THE COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM
A COMPARISON WITH CIVIL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
By

JAMES BARCLAY SMT"ITH*
I

T

HOSE endowed with- the conceptual blessing of civil supremacy must be ever alert to maintain it. By the same token, a
people charged, through the representative process, with the administration of a system which deals so intimately with so many ,of
its members and with such important aspects of government as
does our system of military justice must be ever vigilant to observe
its operation to the purpose of its more efficient functioning, and
the improvement of its methods and structure. This is a study in
the performance of that purpose designed to disclose the relative
merits of the military with the civil process as a modern system designed fairly to determine the truth. We feel a smug satisfaction of
traditional inertia in the enlightened justice of the Federal civil
courts. As a non-military people, we are suspicious of military justice because we are unfamiliar with it. That its faults may be less
than the accepted standard of virtue does not justify them. It should
give assurance and perspective to a design for improvement to observe them in parallel function. In approaching the problem of
determining what is good and what improvements are called for in
the system of military justice, it is necessary to observe, briefly at
least, the function of prescribed conduct and the rules of its enforcement in terms of the theory of fundamental governmental principles;
and to observe the progress, .by comparative study, in parallel fields
of endeavor. In this study, general patterns of movements in the
civil jurisdiction, particularly the federal, are examined in outline
with the purpose of disclosing infirmities which have received
attention, and the treatments proposed. These disclose conditions
which may have analogy in the military or provide the suggestion
for improvement of the military. The best thought and study that
have been devoted to related machinery and procedural methods in
the civil jurisdiction have been examined. The youth movements are
set out at some length because many soldiers are less than twentyfive years of age, and because the alerted attention to the young
*Professor of Law, University of Kansas; formerly Lieutenant Colonel,
Army of the United States; life member of The American Law Institute.
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offender and his case may provide the source of analogous application in ameliorating the conditions which produce the crime, or
occasion recidivism. Immediately considered is the theory of criminal procedural rules which, through failure to keep the need of
change abreast of the change of needs, produces a corroding lag in
the public administration of the law of crimes which touches intimately both the individual and the body politic he composes. No
man of imagination can fail to see that the law springs palpably
out of the very roots of life, and moves, or should move, as life
moves. As life is more important than anything that can be said
about it, so the law grows out of life, and is molded and being constantly remolded to serve the people from whose being it springs.
The final objective is complete ideation of the most wholesome
principles applicable to the institutions involved in the system of
military justice.- '
GENERAL

Under a political theory as that expressed, for example, by the
Stuarts in which the executive was the State and the people existed
to serve him as such, the purpose of the expression of procedure in
relation to crimes was necessarily very different than that which
arises under a popular, representative, republican system of government. Under the yoke of such a tyranny as the former, the prosecution of the individual may well have seemed to some degree to the
popular mind as persecution. The lawyers, and in turn the judges,
began to reflect the public opinion long before the same was true
of the executive government. The harshness of the laws of crimes
and the brutality of the punishment for their violation were moderated in administration wherever the administrator expressed a
popular or intimate relationship with those governed. This produced
several parallel patterns which continue to cause us no little concern. One was the insistence upon a meticulous proof of every detail of fact. Another, and preceding the proof, was that every possible allegation under the law and of the facts must be set out in
extenso. In their achievement, the prosecutor represented the King.
The insistence upon detail of pleading necessarily raised the opportunity to defeat the King's persecution. It thus may be said that
the purpose, and a legitimate purpose, of legal technicalities was
to bring the law and its administration into closer touch with those
to whom it was applied. Closer, because the public interest was bet'Realistically, it should be borne in mind that system articulates statutes
of the United States. 41 Stat. 787, 10 U. S. C. 1471.
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ter served by the defeat of the legislative purpose than its achievement. The justification for the invention of judicial devices which
produced tautological pleadings, defeatable by the slightest formal
defect, shouldnot be carried over to an age when the repetition produces the opposite effect.
There has been a strong public reaction to the continuation of
old procedures which have lost their virtue to protect the oppressed,
and have in turn, through the growth of organized, syndicated
crime, licensed the professional criminal, under the championship
of astute counsel, to prey upon society. The metamorphosis lies in
the transition from an omniscient, greedy, tyrannous, hostile government exercising a right to be served, to our present representative, republican system of government created by and for the people to whom it owes the duty to operate amelioratively in the performances of its functions. The legislative purpose has become the
popular will, and the use of "tricks" to defeat it raises the public
indignation.
Reference has been made to the position of the public prosecutor. With us, he remains with the executive and not with the
judicial branch of the government, but the executive has been reduced from the role of master to the dignity of public servant. The
executive function is thus to carry out the legislative or popular
will in presenting charges of criminal misconduct to an impartial
judiciary. We have long since changed our fundamental political
bases, but we failed to correlate the machinery of justice to the different grist.

2

The first, and perhaps most serious, consequence of the maladjustment lies in the general loss of confidence and respect for the
bench (courts) and the bar. Another, of more recent origin, finds
source in the public realization that artful distortion of rules designed to protect their homes was about to destroy them. Technical
defenses and safeguards, even written into the Bill of Rights, were
licensing the criminal. The insistence now, increasingly, is upon
prosecution, because we no longer need fear the source and purpose of the definition of the crime. Objectively.descriptive of this
reaction is the program of the Attorney General of the United States
of criminal law enforcement. This led to the development of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Across the country, public discussion focused upon the establishment of State departments of
justice upon the federal pattern. Associated with the activity of the
2
Cf. J.B". Smith, Does Proof of aiIrresistibleImpulse Establish the Defense of Insanity? (1945) 31 Va. L. Rev. 865.
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federal government and the interest of the States, the Commissioners of Uniform Laws and the American Bar Association recommended the adoption of the hot pursuit, and interstate rendition
laws. Cooperation between state and federal law enforcement agencies became factual. The increased emphasis upon prosecution did
not raise a thirst for blood but for fairness. A fairness to the accused, and to society. To assure the former, the outstanding step
was the movement to establish a public office on equal footing of
skill and experience with that of the prosecutor to assure to the
accused an equality of dexterity and zeal in the conduct of his trial,
and the solution of such niceties as the procedure might present.
The balance of the public interest begins to find a new fulcrum in
the public conscience upon the realization that an enlightened system of justice should likely result in the conviction of the wrongdoer, and the acquittal of those falsely charged with misconduct.
Society is protected only when both are expectable. Unless the individual may establish his innocence, there is no personal security
from tyranny today any more than from a Stuart. Unless the judicial process is freed from justice-defeating technicalities which
license the wrongdoer's predaceous practice, there is no more public
security than in the days of the barbarian.
We are immediately confronted with the inherent, chronic error
of law of crimes and its administration that there is some tag and
run test of the identity of a rascal, and that identity by trial and
mechanical formula of disposition are all that is involved. The
interest of society is not primarily served by the sport netting, but
in assuring the unlikelihood of the growth of the subject for the
prosecutor's net. To whatever extent it fails of the first, it must act
in the second. Because conviction follows, it does not mean that a
man has been lost to society and to himself, as an enemy and a
public charge. He may yet be salvaged and restored to usefulness.
In transition from a purely retributive system, increasing study and
attention must constantly be given to matters of prevention, probation, incarceration, clinical and personality study, and after care.
This is so because all are involved in the broader pattern of a system
of justice. Close to the letter of the crime itself are the pre-trial
practices involving detection, arrest, confinement, investigation,
charges, and reference to trial; the trial, involving the prosecution,
the defense, the procedure, and the composition, conduct, and
competency of the court; and the post-trial conduct from the sentence to final execution and discharge from further surveillance.
To observe the strength and weakness of military justice, corn-
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parative study must be made of the progress in other systems under
our own government and those of other nations. An ever present
factor in the military, however, is the element of time associated
with the particular or general occasion, and the immediate public
purpose of sustaining a discipline in an army efficient enough to
promptly destroy the strongest and meanest enemy. This frequently
involves summary jurisdiction founded upon physical contact.
GENERAL CHANGES IN THE MILITARY SYSTEM

While it lends no virtue to the military to point to the anachronisms of other systems, it is proper to' note the general condition
as it discloses the alertness and progress of the former by comparison. In 1905, William Howard Taft made the following statement:
"I grieve for my country to say that the administration of criminal law in all the states in the union is a disgrace to our civilization. We are now reaching the age when we cannot plead youth,
sparse civilization or newness of country, as a cause for laxity in
the enforcement of law."
The counsel of even the great jurist and statesman was not heeded,
and no constructive action was taken with any body of American
laws of crime. In 1935, Dean Pound of the Harvard Law School
was saying to the American Bar Association: "I assume that an
overhauling of the substantive criminal law must be a large part
of a far-reaching program of improvement of punitive justice seeking enduring results. But if the results are to be enduring, the
overhauling must be intelligent, thorough-going, and consistent.
Patchwork tinkering of Criminal Codes at every session of the
Legislature has long been the bane of criminal law. Long and
critical preparation must go before the overhauling." We still await
for that to be done with any American civil code of crimes.
The military code of laws, both substantive and procedural, has
been given greater attention. The Second Continental Congress, in
1775, took sixty-nine articles bodily from the British Code of 1774,
and supplemented them by adding sixteen more. This code was
replaced by the Code of 1776 which was a rearrangement and enlargement with some modifications. In 1806, the Code was modified
so as to fit under the new Constitution. A restatement without
formal revision of substantive matters was made in 1874. However,
a complete revision was made in 1916 which eliminated obsolete
matter, and made many substantial changes looking to a scientific
and modern statement of the military law of crimes. The experience
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of the World War called forth study of the Articles of War by the
Congress, and the Code of 1920 resulted. While most of the numbering and largely the substance of the articles defining crimes in
the Code of 1916 were retained, it was, nevertheless, the intention
of the Congress to revise and republish the code. The 1920 Code
did this by material changes in the substantive law, where occasion
called, and wide changes in the procedural law so that the action
of the Congress properly may be called an overhauling and not

merely a tinkering.'
3
0n 1 January 1921, The Judge Advocate General of the Army published
the following statement.
REVISION OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR
During the early part of the year 1919 several proposed revisions of the
Articles of War were introduced in both Houses of the Sixty-fifth Congress,
third session, and referred to the Military Affairs Committees of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, respectively, and during the month of February, 1919, hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs
upon a bill providing for amendments to the Articles of War, which had
been introduced in the Senate by the chairman of that committee. However,
no bill was reported to either the Senate or the House of Representatives
during that session of the Congress.
Beginning early in the year 1919, careful consideration and study was
given to the whole system of court-martial procedure, with a view to its revision and improvement in the light of experiences of the war. This consideration and study was carried on by the War Department through the
special War Department board on "Courts-Martial and Their Procedure,"
composed of Maj. Gen. Francis J. Kerman, U. S. Army, Maj. Gen. John F.
O'Ryan, New York National Guard, and Lieut. Col. Hugh W. Ogden, Judge
Advocate; by a committee of civilian lawyers appointed by the president of
the American Bar Association; and by the Office of the Judge Advocate General, including a special study of the system of military justice in the British,
French, and Belgian Armies by an officer detailed for that purpose. Through
the courtesy of the various Governments, statistical and other information
relating to the experiences of those armies in administering military justice
during the war were thus placed at the disposal of the Judge Advocate General's Office. Particular acknowledgement is due to Sir Felix Cassel, Judge
Advocate General of the British Forces; to M. Edouard Ignace, French
Undersecretary of State for Military Justice; and to Gen. Baron van Zuylen
van Nyevelt, Auditeur General of the Belgian Army.
The first session of the Sixty-sixth Congress began on May 19, 1919, and
several proposed revisions of the Articles of War were introduced in both
Houses of the Congress at that session, and referred -to the Military Affairs
Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively.
A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs held very
extensive hearings on one of the bills, and went into the subject very fully.
Besides the views of a large number of well-informed witnesses, there were
presented, for the consideration of the subcommittee, the results of the studies
referred to above.
At the conclusion of those hearings, upon the invitation of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, a bill providing for a
revision of the Articles of War was prepared and submitted to the subcommittee by the Judge Advocate General.
That revision, with few changes, was adopted by both the subcommittee
and the full Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, and by the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives; was favorably
reported to both Houses of the Congress by those committees; and subse-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

No legislature, including the Congress, has made any similar
effort with any civil code of laws of crime over the same period.
The rather startling thing'is that every proposed change of material
quently was enacted into law as Chapter II of the Army Reorganization Act
of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 787).
The salient features of the revision are as follows:
1. Enlisted men are placed on a parity with officers in respect of the right
to prefer charges against persons in the military service; but all charges must
be verified by affidavit. (A. W. 70.)
2. The preliminary investigation of charges is made more strict than in
the former code; particularly by the new requirement that, at the preliminary
investigation, full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine
witnesses who appear against him, if they are available. (A. W. 70.)
3. The present regulation (C. M. C. M. No. 5, July 14, 1919, par. 76a),
which requires that, before directing the trial of a case by general courtmartial, the convening authority shall refer the charges presented to his staff
judge advocate for consideration and advice, is made mandatory by statute.
(A. W. 70, par. 3.)
4. Unnecessary delay on the part of"an officer in investigating charges
or carrying a case to a final conclusion is made an offense punishable by trial
by court-martial. (A. W. 70.)
5. Resort to arrest instead of confinement pending trial in the cases of
,enlisted men charged with minor offenses is prescribed instead of merely being authorized. This places enlisted men upon the same footing as officers in
respect of such offenses. (A. W. 69.)
6. Resort to the power of commanding officers to administer disciplinary
punishment under the one hundred and fourth article of war in preference to
resort to courts-martial, is encouraged.
7. The appointment by the convening authority of defense counsel, and
one or more assistants, in the same manner in which trial judge advocates
and their assistants are appointed, is made mandatory by statute. This places
the defense upon the same footing as the prosecution before the court, but does
not prevent the man tried from being represented by his own counsel, if he so
desires. (A. W. 11, 17.)
8. A "law member" is provided for every general court-martial (A. W.
8, par. 2), with power to rule upon all interlocutory questions, except challenges, subject (except as to rulings on the admissibility of evidence) to an
appeal to the court itself. (A. W. 31.)
9. The requirement (which heretofore has existed by regulation) that
every record of trial by a general court-martial or military commission shall
be referred to a staff judge advocate or to the Judge Advocate General for
advice before action thereon by the reviewing or confirming authority, is made
mandatory by statute. (A, W. 46.)
10. The words, "'in time of peace," are eliminated from the forty-fifth
article of war,.thus enabting the President to fix the maximum limits of punishment in,time of war, as well as in time of peace.
11. The prohibition (which heretofore has existed by regulation), against
(a), the reconsideration by a court, at proceedings in revision, of an acquittal;
a finding of not guilty of any specification; or a finding of not guilty of any
charge, unless the record shows a finding of guilty under a specification laid
under that charge, which sufficiently alleges a violation of some article of
- war; and (b), the adjudication by a court, at proceedings in revision, of a
sentence more severe than that previously adjudged by it (unless the sentence previously adjudged was less than the mandatory sentence fixed by law
for the offense or offenses upon which a conviction was had), is made mandatory by statute. (A. W. 40.)
12. Provision is made for a new trial in proper cases. (A. W. 40, 47,
49, 50%2.)
13. A unanimous vote of the members of the court for death sentences,
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content in either the procedural or substantive field has been preceded by the military in the field of simplified improvement. While
these will receive further consideration, there may be noted here
a vote of three-fourths of the members of the court for sentences involving
confinement for life or for more than 10 years, and a vote of two-thirds of
the members of the court for all other sentences, is required. (A. W. 43.)
14. Provision is made for a system of appellate review for all general
court-martial cases. (A. W. 503/2.)
15. Provision is made for greater flexibility in the suspension of sentences. (A. W. 52.)
Other changes in the interest of better administration and greater flexibility which may be mentioned are: An amendment to Articles of War 5 and
6, removing the maximum limit as to the number of members for general and
special courts-martial; a change in Article of War 18 which allows each side
one peremptory challenge (the law member of the court not being subject to
challenge, except for cause) ; and a change in nomenclature from "judge
advocate" to "trial judge advocate," to avoid possible confusion with the staff
judge advocate.
With the exception of Articles 2, 23, and 45, which took effect on June 4,
1920, the date on which the act was approved, the revision will go into effect
on February 4, 1921. The provisions of the act which have already become
effective are as follows:
Article 2, "Persons subject to military law," is amended so as to include
members of the Army Nurse Corps, warrant officers, Army field clerks, and
field clerks Quartermaster Corps.
Article 23, "Refusal to appear and testify," is amended so as to provide
that every person not subject to military law, who before any court-martial,
military tribunal, or military board, or in connection with, or in relation to
any proceedings or investigation before it, is guilty of any of the acts made
punishable as offenses against public justice by any provision of chapter 6 of
the act of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1088-commonly known as the Federal
Penal Code), or any amendment thereof, shall be punished as provided therein.
Article 45, "Maximum limits" (of punishment), is amended so as to enable the President to prescribe the maximum limits of punishment for trials
by courts-martial in time of war, as well as in time of peace.
The present revision of the Manual for Courts-Martial has been prepared
primarily to conform the manual to the changes in the Articles of War accomplished by the act of June 4, 1920, and to embody the results of decisions
made by the Office of the Judge Advocate General and the War Department,
and such other changes in the regulations for the government of courts-martial
and courts of inquiry as have been approved by experience. The aim is to
adhere to the principle observed in drafting the preent revision of the Articles of War, viz, to make changes dictated by experience, while at the same
time holding fast to ancient principles that have proven their value.
The salient changes in the Manual, besides those required to conform to
the new Articles of War, are:
(a) Paragraph 219, procedure in cases of insanity, has been entirely rewritten.
(b) Depositions may be taken on oral, as well as upon written, interrogatories.
(c) The chapter on evidence has been rewritten.
(d) More definite provisions have been made concerning the curative
effect of the thirty-seventh article of war.
(e) With a view to reducing the number of court-martial trials, greater
stress is laid upon the disciplinary powers of organization commanders; and
(f) The appendices have been, in large measure, rewritten, and some
new ones added, e. g., Appendix 9, forms for use of the president and the law
member of courts-martial.
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such matters as arrest and bail, pre-trial investigation, the information, technical pleas, trial procedure, the public defender, summary
jurisdiction, functions of the court, non-unanimous verdicts,4 auto-

matic corrective appellate process, rehabilitation, and clemency.
REFORMS

In terms of the force carried by the great weight of its prestige,
perhaps the most important movement for improvement in the
laws dealing with crimes is the recommendation of the American
Law Institute's Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice for the
production of a Model Code of Criminal Law. The code contemplated would embody "not only the rules of substantive law and
procedure, but also the organization and administration of courts
and other agencies for the prevention, detection and prosecution of
crime and delinquency." It insisted that "the Institute should endeavor to create a code more nearly suited to modern sociil and
economic conditions," with the protection of society as its basic aim.
This language demonstrates not a public concern in convictions,
but an aroused public resentmeht in the impotency of legal machinery to gear itself -to the organized criminal. The same sentiment was expressed in the movement known as the United States
Attorney General's law enforcement program. The striking aspect
of the latter is that an energetic effort to perform oath-bound duty
should carry so marked an element of novelty and notoriety about
it. But even more astounding is the fact that these many stimuli
have not found themselves expressed in any overhauled code of
the substantive law of crimes.
Tinkering provided some aid in the war against gangsters and
racketeers. "War" not prosecution came to be a vernacular expression, as well it might, when the ordered forces for the protection of society were opposed by such a show of force as to terrorize
whole communities. Some legislatures took the surprise out of the
alibi defense by notice thereof in advance of trial. All efforts to
allow the trier of facts to draw an adverse inference from the accused's failure to take the stand in his own behalf failed. 5 The rule
developed as a matter of fairness to the accused at a time when he
was disqualified from testifying in his own behalf.6 It has no
foundation when the stand is his for the asking.
410 U. S.
. 1514.
5

1d., 1945.
See (1929) Rice v. United States, 35 Fed. 2nd 689; (1932) Brown v.
U. S., 56 Fed. 2nd 997.
6
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In the field of detection, the pattern of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is receiving much following in state-wide local organizations of some skill and capacity for sustained effort. More
effective prosecution has resulted from adoption of the plan of the
federal Department of Justice.
The movement started by the United States Attorney General
found head in what was popularly known as the Crime Conference
in Washington in December, 1934. His plan was directed to three
phases, simply put, of prevention, apprehension, and correction.
His purpose was to create, in the Department of Justice, a new
Bureau of Crime Prevention, and to expand the functions of the
i Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Prisons. Tracking down
the established criminal was one thing but stopping the source or
manufacture of criminals from the advanced teen-age group, which
was disclosed as the principal feeder, had acquired an indisputable
inportance.7
II

The trend of legislation related to crimes under civil authority
can be shown by a brief outline of the federal jurisdiction. The early
supposition that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common
law cases was within the implied powers granted to the federal
courts was repudiated; and it became definitely established in order
for a federal court to take jurisdiction it was necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should exist for declaring any act or
omission a criminal offense although it has been declared proper
for the courts to look to the common law for definitions both of
crimes and of terms used in the criminal law. The Constitution does
not specifically outline the field of federal criminal law jurisdiction.
Except for a few express specifications such as those providing for
the punishing of treason, piracies, counterfeiting, and for suppressing insurrections, we must look to other grants of powersuch as "regulating the territory or other property belonging to the
United States," levying taxes, establishing post-roads and postoffices, and regulating foreign and interstate commerce, and work
out, in connection therewith, implied power to use the criminal law
as one agency for accomplishing these results. The law governing
piracies and offenses on the high seas developed almost entirely prior
to 1850; the laws relating to the slave trade and peonage were passed
during two periods, the first prior to 1825, and the second during
7This, in turn, is the source of two later movements subsequently to be
noted.
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the period of the Civil War and reconstruction; the laws defining
offenses against the postal system came mostly during the quarter
of a century from 1850 to 1875, with occasional additions from time
to time since then; the use of the commerce clause as a basis for
criminal law was apparently unthought of prior to 1850, and received its main development between 1900 and 1915 with a recent
resurgence; offenses against neutrality made their appearance in
the federal law during the period immediately after the war of 1812,
and again in the World War period. More recent changes have
borne close resemblance to earlier decades, and represent logical
developments to meet new conditions. The recent bank robbery act
follows through the act of 1863 making it a crime to steal the personal property of the United States, the law of 1867 making it a
crime to injure mail bags, to steal post-office property, to break and
enter a post-office, or to injure letter boxes. The recently enacted
law making it a federal crime to kill a federal officer has its counterpart in the law of 1790 making it a crime to obstruct process or
assault an officer, and the law of 1872 making it a federal offense
to assault, wound, or rob a custodian of the mail. The National
Stolen Property Act of 1934 is the logical development of the series
of laws which provide penalties for transportation in interstate
commerce of articles which, for one reason or another, have acquired an illegal character; for example, the lottery tickdt act of
1895, obscene books in 1897, poached wild game of 1900, prize
fight films of 1912, stolen motor vehicles of 1919, and of kidnapped
persons of 1932. These were supplemented by laws making it a
crime to conspire to transport kidnapped persons or stolen cattle,
and the sending of threatening communications in interstate commerce. The law prohibiting the aiding of escapes from federal penitentiaries or causing mutinies therein or introducing dangerous
instrumentalities into federal penitentiaries, the Federal Bank Robbery Act, the Train Wrecking Act, and the Federal Anti-racketeering Act provide examples of laws enacted upon the public reaction
to recently occurring events or outstanding criminal episodes. To
close the gap between state and federal action, Congress extended
the state crimes of 1933 to include federal enclaves, and supplemented this with the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction to
any land under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States.
This is the reason for the federal act making it a crime to flee from
one state to another for the purpose .of avoiding prosecution or the
giving of testimony in felony cases.
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III
The procedural side of the federal penal system is characterized,
by the 1937 Annual Report of the Attorney General, "Delay in the
administration of Justice is still the outstanding defect of our Federal Judicial System."-He noted the principal types of delay as follows: "First-the gap between the date of filing the suit and the time the case is in shape for trial,
i.e., the date on which issue is joined by the filing of the final pleading. This
period is protracted beyond all reason in almost every jurisdiction. It is the
stage characterized by dilatory pleas, motions to dismiss, demurrers, and other
technical proceedings. In many districts this defect is accentuated because
matters of this kind are heard only once a month and sometimes only on the
first day of the term. In places, and there are many, in which only one or
two terms of court are heard annually, the filing of a dilatory plea, a motion
to dismiss or a demurrer may result in a postponement of the trial for at least
six months or perhaps a year. Second-delay arises because of the time elapsing between joinder of issue (the date on which the final pleading is filed)
and the earliest date on which the case can be reached for trial in due course,
even if no attempt to postpone is made by any of the parties thereto. Even
when measured by this standard in 17 districts the trial dockets are in arrears.
In three of them (the District of Columbia, the Eastern District of Michigan,
and the Western District of Washington), the congestion is so severe that
the time lag is between 1 and 2 years. This computation, of course, does not
include the time consumed in the preliminary stages of the case prior to joinder
of issue. We must not be misled by the statement that in the other districts
the trial dockets are said to be current. All that this means is that after the
final pleading is filed in any case, the trial may be had at the next ensuing
term of course, if the parties and the court cooperate. It does not follow,
therefore, that in such districts the business is actually current in any true
sense, for the word (current) does not take into account the time consumed
during the preliminary period before the case is in shape for trial or the time
lost between the time when a case may theoretically be tried and the time
when it is actually tried; nor does it make any allowance for the fact that in
many divisions and at many places of holding court, terms are convened but
once or twice a year. The interval elapsing between terms of court may alone
account for a delay as of much as a year between the time the case is in shape
for trial and the earliest date upon which it can actually be heard. That this
is an important factor may be deduced from the fact that sessions of the
United States District Courts are held at 376 different places. At 115 of these
places there is only one term a year, while at 242 of them there are only two
terms annually. At only 19 places are there more than two terms a year.
Ingenious counsel are frequently able to postpone actual trial despite the
utmost efforts of adversary parties to bring the matter to a hearing. Overworked judges are at a disadvantage in their efforts to drive forward the
business of the courts. The existence of actual delay even in districts where
the trial dockets are reported to be in a so-called current condition is exclusively demonstrated by the large number of pending cases that were filed
more than two years ago, and are still undisposed of. For example, in New
Jersey and in the Western District of Wisconsin over 60 percent of the pending cases are more than two years old, while in the Northern District of
Indiana and in the Southern District of Illinois this is true in 59 percent of
the pending cases. In Delaware this is true of over 46 percent of the cases;
in Vermont of over 42 percent; in the Western District of Missouri of over
39 percent; in Kansas of over 37 percent. Yet, in all these districts the trial
dockets are reported as being in a so-called current state. Third-delay arises
out of intervals frequently elapsing between the final submission of a matter
for judicial decision and the date upon which a decision is rendered. Some of
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The above report states that the situation, as depicted, is manifestly inconsistent with any sound idea of judicial efficiency, and
that it will remain so until we correct the conditions which caused
it. The defects are said to be due to an insufficient personnel, a tolerance of technicalities, a lack of a united, simple and coherent
system of procedure, and lack, of efficient administrative methods.
The first could be relieved by the creation of more judgeships, the
second by an improved code of procedure; and the third by the creation of an administrative officer to correlate the business of the
courts under the Supreme Court of the United States.
IV
When we examine the source of the rules of procedure in criminal cases in the federal courts, the reason for some of the delays
above described is apparent.
The Conformity Act of 1872, which requires the federal courts
to conform to the state practice in actions at law, does not apply
to criminal proceedings. The latter were governed by Section 722
of the Revised Statutes. 9
Thus the federal criminal procedure was governed by a strangeadmixture of various federal statutes, the rules of common law,
and in some isolated matters by state statutes. Where statutes deal
with a specific matter of criminal pleading, practice, and procedure
the difficulty is not so great. The subjects covered by the statutes,
which are not numerous, include the requirement that at least
twelve grand jurors must concur in finding an indictment ;1O a provision permitting several counts in one indictment "which may be'
the judges have called attention to this unfortunate situation and have asserted
that the volume of business confronting them is so great that the time during
which they are not actually sitting on the bench is so limited that they do not
have adequate opportunity to study the cases or prepare their decisions."
9U. S. Code, Title 28, Sec. 729, which reads as follows:
"The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district and circuit courts by the provisions of this Title, and the Title 'Civil

Rights,' and the Title 'Crimes,' for the protection of all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all
cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses
against law, the common law as modified and charged by the constitution
and statutes of the States wherein the court having jurisdiction of such
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and if it
is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found
guilty."
IOU. S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 554.
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properly joined";- the contents of an indictment for perjury; 12
effect of judgment on demurrer';13 the requirement that in capital
offenses a copy of the indictment and a list of the jurors and witnesses be furnished to the defendant at least two days before the
trial ;14 hearings before committing magistrates ;1" removal proceedings" and search warrants.' 7 However, the great majority of matters bearing on criminal procedure were not covered by any federal
statute. In this situation the common law must be looked to, that is
the common law as modified by state constitutions and state legislation. Even if the trail through the forest of modifications were
a clear one, still the federal courts would not be free of the entanglement of ancient common law procedure. Of the situation, Mr.
Justice Clifford said in Tennessee v.Davis :"s
"Examined in the most favorable light, the provision is a mere
jumble of Federal law, common law, and State law, consisting of
incongruous and irreconcilable regulations, which in legal effect
amounts to no more than a direction to a judge sitting in such a
criminal trial to conduct the same as well as he can, in view of the
three systems of criminal jurisprudence, without any suggestion
whatever as to what he shall do in such an extraordinary emergency
if he should meet a question not regulated by anyone of the three
systems."
The Congress, from the first, has given the head of the civil
courts, the Supreme Court of the United States, rule making power
in admiralty and equity, and has added, long since, bankruptcy, and
copyright matters. Specific authorization was made for the Court
to provide and promulgate the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States which became effective in September, 1928. In 1934, the Supreme Court, pursuant to an act of
Congress, promulgated rules prescribing practice and procedure
with respect to proceedings in criminal cases after verdict. By like
authority the Court has been engaged in the drafting of rules of
criminal procedure prior to verdict which will become effective
three months after the termination of the present session of the
Congress. It will thus be seen that the recommendations of the
Attorney General, set out above, are being acted upon in part
by the appointment of more judges, by the preparation of a
"Id. Sec. 557.
Id. Sec. 558.
131d.
Sec. 561.
4
2 1d. Sec. 562.
25Id. Secs. 591 and 595.
'Old. Sec. 591.
17Id. Secs. 610 and&632.
18(1879) 100 U. S. 257, 299,25 L. Ed. 648, speaking of R. S. 722.
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comprehensive code of criminal procedure (yet to be effected) ;
and in the creation of the Administrator for the federal judiciary
directly under the Supreme Court of the United States. It should
be noted also, in this connection, that the rules of evidence suffered
from the same dry-rot as the rules of procedure. Upon the relation
of Funk v. United States '" and"Wolfle v. United States, 20 Rule 26
of the pending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now provides
that the "admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of
Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the
co'imon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience." 21. Much of the credit
for a major part of the success of the suggestions which have resulted in 'plans to prepare codes of criminal procedure must be
given to the widely approved result of the American Law Institute's studies, and in its model code completed in 1930.
V
Out of the efforts of the American Law Institute, and the plan
to revise the substantive law of crimes into an intelligent modem
code, announced in 1933, have come other developments. The Institute released its model act "The Youth Correction Authority
Act" in May, 1940. This program has received widespread approval by action in New York, Rhode Island, Virginia, Massachusetts, and many other states. The Model Act has been adopted
almost in toto in California. An idea for the correctional treatment
of youthful offenders emerged from the work of the Delinquency
Committee of the Boy's Bureau of the Community Service Society
in New York. Early in 1938, it made public a report on youthful
offenders and the criminal justice system. The report was published
by the Macmillan Company under the title, "Youth In The Toils."
Two years later, the American Law Institute published its model
Youth Correction Authority Act. The Conference of Senior United
States Circuit Judges made an intensive study of the subject of
punishment for crime. They first prepared a proposed act'dealing
primarily with the Youth problem. Another committee dealt with
adult offenders. The two proposals were integrated into a single
proposed act, the Federal Corrections Act, upon which the House
19 (1933) 290 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 369.
20(1934) 291 U. S. 7, 54 S. Ct. 279, 78 L. Ed. 617.
2
1Cf.
Swift v. Tyson, (1842) 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865, with Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 58 S.Ct.817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, on substantive matters.
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of Representatives Judiciary Committee began hearings on May
18, 1943.22 The proposed act was divided into four titles. It contemplates a completely integrated correctional system under a Board
of Corrections in the Department of Justice, composed of ten members appointed by the Attorney General. The Board is to comprise
a Division on Adult Corrections, a Youth Authority Division, and
a Policy Division. Members to serve on the Division of Adult
Corrections and the Youth Authority Division are to be appointed
by the chairman of the Board. The Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, one member designated by the Division on Adult Corrections, and one member designated by the Youth Authority Division
are to constitute the Policy Division which is empowered to lay
down general treatment and correctional policies which the Director of the Bureau of Prisons in the administration of the penal
and correctional system shall carry out. It also is empowered to lay
down general policies with respect to parole and supervision during conditional release.
Title III deals with youthful offenders. Its underlying theory
is to substitute for retributive punishment methods of training and
treatment designed to correct and prevent anti-social tendencies. It
departs from the merely primitive idea of dealing with criminals,
and looks to the objective idea of rehabilitation. The act defines a
youth offender as a male person under 24 years of age at the time
of conviction. It defines "treatment" as corrective and preventive
training and treatment designed to protect the public by correcting
the anti-social tendencies of youth offenders. If the court finds that
the youth offender does not need treatment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence, and place the youth offender on
probation. Thus, the power of the court to grant probation is left
undisturbed. If the court finds that a convicted person is a youth
offender, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment, it may, as
a penalty for the offense and in lieu of the penalty otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the
Youth Authority Division for treatment and supervision until discharged by the Authority as provided for. If the court finds that
the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment and should
not be committed to the Youth Authority Division, it may sentence
the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
Thus, the court in its discretion may, in the case of a youth offender,
either grant probation, sentence to the Youth Authority Division,
or sentence under other applicable law. If the youth offender is
22H. R. 2140, 78th Congress. See also H. R. 2139.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

committed to the Youth Authority Division, he will be sent first
to a classification center where a classification agency set up by the
'Director of the Bureau of Prisons will make a complete study of
the youth offender, including a mental and physical examination, to
ascertain his personal traits, his capacities, pertinent circumstances
of his school, family life, any previous delinquency or criminal experience, and any mental or physical defect or other factor contributingto his delinquency. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, this study will be completed within a period of thirty days.
The classification agency will then forward to the Youth Authority
Division a report of the findings with respect to the youth offender,
and its recommendations as to his disposition. Upon receipt of such
report and recommendation, the Youth Authority Division will
make an order permitting the youth offender to remain at liberty
conditionally under supervision, allocate and direct the transfer
of the youth offender to an agency or institution for treatment, or
order the youth offender confined under such conditions as it believes best designed for the protection of the public.
The Bureau of Prisons is required to designate, set aside, and
adapt institutions and agencies under the control of the Department
of Justice for the treatment of youth offenders. Such institutions
and agencies are to be used only for the treatment of youth offenders,
in so far as that is practical, and youth offenders are to be segregated from adult offenders, and the classes of youth offenders are
to be segregated according to the needs for treatment. The Youth
Authority Division may at any time release conditionally, under
supervision, a youth offender committed to it; and may discharge
him unconditionally at the expiration of one year from the date
of conditional release. It is required to release a youth offender
conditionally, under supervision, on or before the expiration of
four years from the date of bis conviction, and to release him unconditionally on or before the expiration of six years from the date
of his conviction. Youth offenders permitted to remain at liberty
or conditionally released are to be under the supervision of the
United States probation officers, supervisory agents appointed by
the Chief Parole officer, and voluntary supervisory agents approved
by the Chief Parole officer. The Board is authorized to encourage
the formation of groups of voluntary supervisory agents. The
powers and duties of voluntary supervisory agents are to be limited
and defined by regulations adopted by the Board. The Bureau of
Prisons is required to make periodic examinations of all youth
offenders under treatment, and to report to the Authority as to
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each youth offender at such intervals as the Youth Authority Division shall direct. Supervisory officials are also required to make
like reports respecting youth offenders conditionally released under
their supervision. Upon the unconditional discharge by the Youth
Authority Division of a youth offender before the expiration of six
years from the date of his conviction, the act provides that the sentences shall be automatically set aside and held for naught; and that
the Youth Authority Division shall issue for the youth offender a
certificate to that effect.
The most important features of the plan are integration of correctional measures under a single body, segregation of youth offenders from adult offenders and segregation of classes of youth
offenders, power to develop variety of treatment facilities, flexibility of operations in adapting particular forms of treatment to individual youths in accordance with their favorable or unfavorable
responses, adequate supervision during conditional release, and the
focusing of effort on the important youth-crime problem.
The Judges prepared a separate, companion act which provides
that any person arrested for an offense against the United States,
subject to the approval of the court having jurisdiction over the
person and the offense, may waive in writing an indictment by
grand jury and consent to be charged by information, and may enter
a plea of guilty to the information, or consent to a trial upon the
information before the court without a jury. In many districts,
intervals of several months elapse between the sessions of grand
juries. It was thought desirable that offenders, particularly youth
offenders, not be held in jails for long periods awaiting the return
of indictments, that they should not be subjected to the contaminating environment of jails. Many such offenders will be willing to
waive indictment, and enter a plea of guilty to an information or to
consent to trials by the courts. The separate act contemplated this
desirable procedure. Under the pending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, waiver of indictment by the defendant is admitted.
VI
The importance of this pending legislation is so great that it
seems desirable to set out the basis upon which the expectancy of
success is founded. That basis is the demonstrated experience under
the Borstal system in England. It follows.
A report of a Department Committee on Prisons appointed by
the Home Secretary in 1894 to inquire into the administration'of
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the English prisons found, among other things, that an extremely
large number of youths between the ages of 16 'and 21 passed
through the prisons every year, that under the existing system
numbers of these young prisoners came out of the prison in a condition as bad or worse than when they went in, and that the age
when the majority of habitual criminals are made lies between 16
and 21 years. As a result, an experiment was begun in a wing of
Bedford Prison. Younger boys were segregated from the men, and
a special program of trade instruction, drill, and a scheme of rewards and encouragements to industry and good conduct was introduced. A wing of the prison at Borstal was set aside for the
special handling of offenders between 16 and 23. By the end of
1902, the entire institution at Borstal was devoted to an intensive
program for this age group of hard woik and strict discipline, tempered by contrivances of reward, encouragement, and hope. From
this experimental beginning has developed what is now known as
the Borstal System in England. It now embraces eleven institutions. Five are walled. Four are completely open. Each institution
has its own particular specialty. One provides complete facilities
for craft training in metal and woodwork. Another is laid out and
run as a summer camp with work and recreational programs which
keep the boys out of doors. A third is largely devoted to agriculture
and stock breeding. One recent institution develops skilled workers
in the building trades. At one, the boys spend their entire work day
at one kind of labor, reclamation of marsh lands of the North Sea
at the mouth of the River Witham. While the institutions differ
in many respects, they have certain things in common. These are,
first, a full 16 hour day of arduous, active work and recreation,
leaving no time for brooding or self-pity; secondly, an individual
plan based on close acquaintance with individual needs and antecedents, and calculated to return the young man to society as a social
and rehabilitated citizen; thirdly, a high degree of personal interest on the part of the staff, particularly the house master, whose
chief job is individual guidance. The Borstal method of rehabilitation relies upon the physical, physiological, and social characteristics of youth which distinguishes them from both children and
adults. It is pyedicated on the concept that criminal youth require
special treatment because of the number and kind of offenses they
commit, the causation factors underlying their conduct, and the
prospect they hold out for success through correctional treatment.
Three cardinal principles dominate the system: (1) flexibility,
(2) individualism, and (3) emphasis on the intangibles. Flexibility
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means that a premium is placed on experimentation and originality.
Individualism is facilitated by careful study at an observation center to which all the boys sentenced to Borstal detention are sent,
and by assigning each youth to the particular Borstal that is best
fitted to meet his particular problems. The quality of the personnel
is probably the most important of the intangibles. The System has
attracted a capable and devoted personnel. Generally, persons between the ages of 16 and 23 may be sentenced to Borstal training.
After commitment, the youth is sent directly to a classification center where he spends a minimum of thirty days before he is assigned.
During the time he is under observation, a detailed study of his
social and family background is made, and he receives a physical
and mental examination. The assignment board then sends him to an
institution of maximum, medium, or minimum security. During his
stay in the institution to which he is allocated, the Borstal boy is not
cut off from life in the outside world. ie may receive frequent
visits from his relatives and friends. Little limit is set upon the
number of letters he may send or receive. Once a week, he goes
on a route march, or informal hike, outside of the institution. For
one or two weeks each summer he may camp with his group under
the control of a housemaster in a completely free and unfenced
spot in the country. If he is at one of the open institutions, he may
go alone or in a group to a moving picture, and to classes in the
town. In some instances, he is allowed to go home 6 nce during his
period of treatment to see his family, or to arrange for a job after
his release. Escapes are infrequent, only four percentum of the entire population of the eleven institutions. Great thoroughness is
practiced in the steps to graduation, rehabilitation, and counsel.
In 1936, out of England's total prison population of 8,964, there
were only 688, or 8.1 percentum, ex-Borstal boys. At that time,
13,294 had graduated from the Borstal system. Our judges hope
that their plan will turn 70 percentum of youth offenders into wholesome pursuits instead of permanently to the ranks of crime. Too
much attention cannot be given to -this salutary program. The
judges were aware that within the Department of Justice much
progress had been made in the more scientific treatment of offenders. in segregation, and in use of the probation system. They
believed such measures wholly inadequate, and brought forward
their proposed Federal Corrections Act.
In connection with the American Law Institute's Youth Correction Authority Act, its companion measure, The Youth Court Act,
should be noticed. It is not so much a model statute as it is a declara-
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tion of two basic objectives, (1) to shorten the time which now
elapses between the arrest of the adolescent offender and the fiRial
disposition of his case, and (2) 'to improve the conditions under
which he is apprehended and detained. It would cover offenders between the juvenile court jurisdiction and twenty-one years of age. It
calls for additional judges who may"sit as examining magistrates as
well as to try cases. It provides for a "presenting attorney" whose
duties go beyond those of the ordinary prosecuting attorney. The
presenting attorney is directly responsible to the court, and his duties
include: collection and organization of the evidence relating to allegations of violations of laws by persons within the age of jurisdiction
of the court; cooperation with the police in securing evidence concerning the accused; determining, subject to the approval of the
court, the propriety of further action against the youth; drafting
accusations; performing, in general and concerning youths, the
functions of the prosecuting attorney; assisting the court "in protecting society and the individual, and in administering justice to
the innocent as well as the guilty." At least once a week, he is required to furnish the court a list of all cases which have not been
disposed of by discharge or final judgment, together with information regarding the date of arrest, date of initiation of the proceeding, and the state of the proceeding in each case. The judge of the
court is empowered to appoint counsel for the youth, a public
defender in effect. Defense counsel is permitted to enlist the services of the legal aid society and other voluntary defender organizations. The court is authorized to appoint an administrative officer,
who, in addition to being clerk of the court, is given supervision
over plant and structures under the control of the Youth Court,
and the management of detention places. To prevent the mixing
in the courthouse "bull-pen," the court is authorized to designate
a proper place for the detention of youth offenders. The case may
proceed on information. No change is made as to bail, preliminary
hearing, jury, counsel, ptiblicity of trial, appeal, etc. The procedure
is still the procedure of the .riminal court, and the act is limited
to operation in metropolitan areas. The idea of a permanent official
whose function would be to defend the accused, and to oppose the
prosecutor befbre the courts, has found increasing support since
its introduction in California many years ago. H. R. 662823 is a
modified form of a plan to maintain a salaried official to protect the
rights of the accused. It provides that each district court may
appoint a public defender for each place where it sits. The appointee
2
77th Congress.
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may be full-time or part-time, and have assistants in the discretion
of the court. The bill carries a pauper's clause for all cases, and
attaches only to the more important ones, not to petty offenses. The
salary of the public defender is to be fixed by the Judicial Conference of the United States Circuit Judges. For more than a quarter of a century, the accused before courts-martial of record have
24
been provided with defense counsel.
In addition to the legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference of Senior United States Circuit Judges at its meeting in 1942,
above described, the conference reached the following conclusions:
(1) The sentencing function should be left in the trial courts. (2)
Long term sentences should be finally fixed only upon the basis of a
thorough study of the accused and the corrective effect of sentence
upon him. (3) The general theory of the Borstal System is sound
in the rehabilitation of youthful offenders. (4) The treatment of
accused of all ages under minor sentences is unwholesome, and
treatment in camps and under wholesome employment conditions
should be practiced in lieu of idleness in unsanitary local jails in
association with long-term prisoners. (5) Long delays between detention and trial are bad in all cases, and are especially so where
the offense is a minor one. (6) Aid should be given discharged
prisoners through some intelligent parole system for not less than
two years. (7) The functions of sentencing and paroling must be
correlated so that the functions may be discharged more wisely for
the protection of society, and the rehabilitation of the offenders.
It is significant that the judges insisted upon the retention of the sentencing and probation powers. In doing so, however, they sought every modern device for complete information
about the accused person to the end that their judgment might
be wise in these matters. It is fair to say of the whole picture of
probation that it primarily forced itself upon the Department
through the congestion of the prison population as a housing-relief
device. Holiness followed housing pressure. The improvement of
methods and personnel in the Department of Justice, combined with
the increased public attention, seems to have given probation a
primary place in the human-salvaging program. The third annual
report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts indicates that thirty-four thousand three hundred
and fifty-nine persons convicted of offenses in the federal courts,
including probationers, parolees and persons on conditional release,
were under supervision by federal probation officers throughout
2410 U. S. C. 1481, and 1488.
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the country ,(except in the District of Columbia which has its own
probation service) at the end of the fiscal year of 1942.
VII.
The program of Army penology 5 presently being carried out is
one of the most extensive, thorough-going, and modern in Ameri25
The system started when the United States Military Prison was established by R. S. 1344, as amended by Act 21 May 1874 (18 Stat. 48). The
amendatory act fixed the location of the prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
instead of at Rock Island, Illinois, as provided in the o-iginal act. The
amendatory act, although passed before the enactment of the Revised Statutes,
became effective as a subsequent statute, and as,repealing any portion of the
Revised Statutes inconsistent therewith, by virtte of R. S. 5601. Thereafter,
provisions for the transfer of the military prison at Fort Leavenworth from
the Department of War to the Department of Justice, to be known and used as
a United States Penitentiary, were made by Act 2 March 1895, sec. 1. Subsequent provisions for the erection of a United States penitentiary on a site on
the Fort Leavenworth Reservation, and for the restoration to the Department
of War of the premises transferred therefrom to the Department of Justice,
when such penitentiary should be completed, in accordance with the provisions
of said Act of 2 March 1895, Section 1, were made by the Act of 10 June 1896,
Sec. 1 (29 Stat. 380). The existing laws pertaining to or affecting the United
States Disciplinary Barracks, guards, and disciplinary organizations were continued in force, except as specifically provided otherwise, by section 22 of the
National Defense Act of 3 June 1916 (39 Stat. 181). There is authority given
by Act of Congress to the Secretary of War to designate branches of the main
disciplinary barracks at Leavenworth, a discretion which was exercised to
establish branches in two places-Alcatraz and Castle William, respectively,
at San Francisco and at Governors Island, New York (38 Stat. 1086). (Today, branches are located in every major geographical section of the United
States.)
When General Crowder became Judge Advocate General on 15 February
1911, a controversy had been going on for years as to the treatment of military prisoners, particularly deserters. Annual reports, service journals, and
the public press contained discussions of the general subject. One class of
Army officers, perhaps the majority, believed in punishment for deterrent
effect; another class favored reformatory methods. Because of the relation
of this subject to the administrationof military justice, The Judge Advocate
General visited and inspected the main branch of our military prisons in
October 1911, and filed an extensive report on 17 November 1911. His report
gave attention to the statute law, the Act of 1874, establishing the prison and
prescribing its government. The organic act followed closely the legislation
of the several States for the establishment and maintenance of penitentiaries.
In some respects the law establishing the military prison was less humane
than later legislation establishing penitentiaries at Leavenworth, McNeil
Island, and Atlanta; and the same illiberal rigid character was found in regulations adopted from time to time by the War Department in aid of the execution of this military prison statute. In the regulations, the War Department
had interpreted uniformly the law as requiring the prison to be administered
as a penitentiary. The prisoners were required to wear the usual prison-striped
clothing, to wear their hair close cropped, to be designated by numbers. and
to be employed at the kind of daily hard labor at which convicts confined in
civil prisons and penitentiaries are customarily employed. General Crowder
expressed surprise at the youth of the prisoners in the military prison, their
average age being twenty-three years. Seventy-one percentum were confined
for purely military offenses and only a comparatively small number for serious
common-law crimes. He then visited the United States Penitentiary, also at
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can history. With the back-log of those out of some fifteen millions
of men who have violated the laws of the United States under the
stress and excitement of war conditions, obviously, the task is one
Fort Leavenworth, where he found the inmates of much more advanced years,
all felons, but subjected to no more severe prison regime than were the youngex-soldiers in the military prison. He concluded that the practice in the
military system was fundamentally wrong. He reached the following conclusions in his report:
"In view of the fact that we are legislatively committed to the minimum use of the labor of military prisoners on new prison construction,
the change from prison to detention barracks must await the completion
of said construction-about two years-unless it can be assumed that
Congress will be found willing to complete said construction by contract
labor. But when the new prison is completed the way will be open tc
inaugurate the change, which can be administratively accomplished, except in the following regards, where it would be advisable to have amendments of the existing law so as to provide:
"1. For changing the name 'United States Military Prison' to
'United States Detention Barracks,' and for making the designation of the inmates of the detention barracks uniform by eliminating
the term 'convict' whereever necessary and substituting therefore the
term 'prisoner,' which latter term is used in the existing- law as
synonymous with the term convict.
"2. For exempting the detention barracks from the existing
provision vesting the government and control of the prison in the
Board of Commissioners of the United States Soldiers' Home; this
for the reason that the detention barracks would become an integral
part of the military establishment, to be administered directly as
any other department thereof.
"3. For modifying the provision of existing law respecting the
employment of prisoners in said detention barracks so as to limit
the daily hard labor of prisoners confined therein to what is required
for purposes of domestic administration, as outlined above by the
prison commandant, and directing that prisoners not so employed
shall be subjected to a rigid course of military training and instruction.
"4. For exempting from the prohibitions of section 1118 of the
Revised Statutes against the enlistment in the military service of
any deserter therefrom and of section 2 of the Act of 1 August 1894
(28 Stat. 216), against the re-enlistment in the military service of
any soldier whose service during his last preceding term of enlistment has not been honest and faithful, all good-conduct prisoners
discharged from the detention barracks or post guardhouse with the
recommendation of the authorities of the detention barracks or post
that they be permitted to re-enlist.
"5. For the modification of the requirements of sections 1996 and
1998, Revised Statutes, so far as they provide that the forfeiture of
citizenship rights or of the right to become citizens shall not attach
to a conviction of desertion committed in times of peace."
The last recommendation (No. 5) was designed to remove the forfeiture
of citizenship rights, or of the right to become citizens, which those statutes
imposed in case of desertion committed in time of peace, leaving that penalty
in force for desertion committed in time of war. Those statutes had their
origin in the Civil War Act of 3 March 1865, and represented the then
thought of Congress on the subject. It was a sweeping, drastic provision
which required that this penalty of forfeiture of citizenship rights and of the
right to become citizens should attach automatically to a conviction of desertion and made no distinction between peace and war. The Judge Advocate
General prepared and submitted projects of legislation to carry out (4) and
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of large proportions. The exercise of clemency is an incident of
the military system from the time charges are contemplated until
the sentence has been executed. Army regulations provide for the
(5) for the War Department which in turn transmitted them to the Congress.
A project of an act repealing the prison statute and substituting therefor the
'disciplinary barracks statute, which ultimately became the Act of 4 March
1915, was submitted by The Judge Advocate General to Congress on 27 May
1912. That project provided for both restoration and re-enlistment of goodconduct prisoners.
At his inspection in 1911, The Judge Advocate General found purely
military offenders held in close association with common-law and statutory
felons. He recommended in his report the segregation of these military
offenders, and on 29 December 1911, this recommendation was carried into
effect by the issue of orders prepared by him directing that all felons held at
Leavenworth, with the exception of a few with short periods of confinement
remaining to be serviced, be transferred to Alcatraz; and all prisoners at
Alcatraz convicted of purely military offenses, with like exceptions, be transferred to Leavenworth; giving to Leavenworth prison the character of a
disciplinary barracks or reformatory, but continuing Alcatraz as a penal
institution. The same order changed the designation of the inmates at Leavenworth from military convicts to general prisoners. The purpose of The Judge
Advocate General was to effect immediately ameliorative reforms in so far
as the statutes would permit. Nothing further was accomplished in the way
of prison reform in the year of 1911. His report was submitted in November,
and segregation was an accomplished fact before 31 December 1911. What
was done was preparatory to the inauguration of greater reforms when the
necessary legislation could be secured from Congress.
In May of 1912, The Judge Advocate General appeared before the military committee of the House in support of the then pending revision of the
Articles of War. Section 2 of that revision contained the reform of prison
statutes. The salient features of the bill were: (1) Changing the designation
from prison to barracks. (2) Segregating military offenders from felons.
(3) Placing the control of the barracks directly under the control of the Secretary of War. (4) Authorizing prisoners confined in the barracks to be
placed under military training with a view to honorable restoration to duty
or re-enlistment; and (5) Authorizing the Secretary of War to restore to
duty prisoners confined in said barracks. This section 2, along with the revision of the Articles of War, failed of a favorable report by the House Committee. However, on 22 August 1912 (37 Stat. 356), Congress enacted the
law recommended by The Judge Advocate General in his 1911 report exempting peacetime deserters from the loss of citizenship rights, and permitting reenlistment of peacetime deserters and other classes or prisoners whose prior
service had not been honest and faithful, when specially authorized by the
Secretary of War. Thereupon the policy of re-enlistment of prisoners confined
in the military prison was immediately entered upon.
As indicated, upon the enactment of 22 August 1912, the policy was commenced of recommending deserving general prisoners confined in the military
prison for re-enlistment. In the annual report of the prison commandant for
the fiscal year ending 30 June 1913, is found the statement that sixty-three
general prisoners had been recommended for re-enlistment under that act. In
August, 1913, The Judge Advocate General made a second inspection of the
military prisons, and in his report of that inspection recommended that steps
should be taken in advance of any authorization by Congress to inaugurate
that part of the scheme of reform which looked to military training of deserving general prisoners. On 17 September 1913, there was issued from the War
Department, upon his recommendation, General Order No. 56, War Department, 1913.
General Order No. 56 authorized and directed the organization of a maximum of four disciplinary companies at Leavenworth prison to be composed

FEDERAL PROCEDURE

periodic examination for clemency of the case of each prisoner
under sentence of a court-martial, once within the first six months
of confinement, and annually thereafter. Special hearings may be
of general prisoners serving sentences for purely military offenses, and further
authorized one disciplinary company at Castle William, Fort Jay. It directed
that members of the disciplinary organization were to be taken out of prison
garb, and put into uniform. They were to be known by name and not by
number, separated from other prisoners, permitted to render and receive the
military salute, and to be armed, equipped, and trained as infantry-all for
the purpose of developing their own self-respect, and fitting them for restoration to duty. Disciplinary companies were organized rather promptly in the
remaining months of 1913 and January, 1914.
It was not until 6 February 1914 that the pending bill to convert the
United States Military Prison into a disciplinary barracks was favorably reported by Senator Chamberlain with some amendments made by the Senate
Military Affairs Committee of which he was then the chairman. The bill
failed to pass at that session of Congress, but partial relief was given in the
Act of 27 April 1914 (37 Stat. 346, 352), and in the form of a rider on the
annual Army appropriations bill, authorizing a suspension of the sentence of
dishonorable discharge when there was reasonable hope of reclaiming him.
The legislation was inserted upon the insistent recommendation of The Judge
Advocate General. As to all men thereafter convicted and sentenced, with a
suspended dishonorable discharge, steps could be taken to restore the men
by remitting the dishonorable discharge, of which the execution had been
suspended, and in this way send them back to their organizations. This was
followed by instructions to commanding generals to suspend sentences of
dishonorable discharge whenever there was a probability of reclaiming the
soldier to honorable service. (G.O. 45, June 9, 1914). In this order it was
announced, that "the object in seeking the legislation authorizing the suspension of dishonorable discharge was to afford a plan of giving soldiers convicted of purely military offenses an opportunity to reclaim themselves and
gain restoration to the colors."
There still remained the large class already in confinement whose sentences of dishonorable discharge already had been executed, and who did not
come within the provisions of the foregoing Act of 27 April 1914, General
Order No. 45. Under the accepted construction of the statute, they could
only get back into the service under the legislation of 22 August 1912, heretofore noted-that is, by re-enlistment for a full term. Not being willing to
wait further for the enactment of the pending bill, which would have included
them, The Judge Advocate General directed a study of Section 1353, Revised
Statutes, which is section 6 of the original prison act, to see if there could not
be deducted therefrom this power of restoration as to inmates of the prison
whose discharges had already been executed. The officer who made the study
(Ansell) concluded that the act was sufficient to reach this class of prisoners.
Secretary of War Garrison gave the opinion his careful consideration, and
approved it 7 March 1914. The Secretary was not without doubt as to its legal
correctness, but believed that Congress would ultimately validate this procedure by giving it the necessary statutory sanction. From that time on, recourse was had to both courses-i.e., to re-enlistment for the full term, and
to restoration to an old enlistment in dealing with the inmates of the prison.
At the time, probably a majority of the officers outside of the War Department viewed the reform with apprehension, as they believed in punishment for
deterrent effect.
Prior to the opinion and direction of the Secretary of War broadening the
construction of section 1353, Revised Statutes, sixty-three inmates of the
prison had been recommended for re-enlistment in the fiscal year ending 30
June 1913, and nearly twice that number before the date of the opinion in
1914. The first man restored under the opinion was restored on 14 March
1914. The record of the fiscal year ending in 1914 at the Leavenworth Prison
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had when justified by the facts and circumstances. The federal civil
system is oriented under the Department of justice, the law officer
of the Government. Within the War Department, the control is
shows that forty percentum of the men discharged from the prison in that
year were iecommended for re-enlistment. Many preferred that course to
restoration. From 14 March to 30 June 1914, thirty-nine men were restored.
Prior to the bill repealing the prison act and substituting the disciplinary
act, the reforms carried out by executive orders and by acts of Congress may
be summarized as follows: (1) Classification and segregation of prisoners,
December 1911. (2) Re-enlistment of inmates as authorized by Act of 22
August 1912. (3) Organization of disciplinary battalions and companies, and
inauguration of military training for purely military offenders, 17 September
1913. (4) Instructions to department commanders to suspend sentences of
dishonorable discharge inaugurated under Act of 27 April 1914. (5) Disciplinary battalion established on 14 October 1914, at branch military prison at
Alcatraz, extending to misdemeanants confined there the privileges of military
training and instruction.
So it was that the system of reform was pretty well established in its
more essential features before Congress finally came to enact the law for the
repeal of the prison statutes, which it did on 4 March 1914, as a rider on the
Army appropriation act. But the act of that date did abolish the penitentiary
character of the institution, change the name, and convert the institution in a
very real sense into a military reform school, where every inmate could earn
by good conduct, irrespective of the length of his sentence, an honorable
restoration with the colors, and an honorable discharge. Little remained to
be done under the act of 4 March 1915. By General Order No. 21, 13 April
1915, drafted by The Judge Advocate General, the disciplinary battalion and
companies were reorganized. The Judge Advocate General had realized that
this scheme was not complete unless we had some corresponding measure of
relief for those who could not be recommended for either re-enlistment or
restoration, and he proposed the relief contained in a separate rider, not part of
the prison section proper, to the Army Appropriations Act of 4 March 1915.
It gave authority to the Secretary of War to establish a system of parole for
inmates of the disciplinary barracks (C. 143, sec. 1, 38 Stat. 1075). On 18
May 1915, regulations were issued under it providing for the release of men
back into civil life who had served at least half of their sentences. The parole
provision was a companion piece of legislation designed to cover the entire
population of the prison.
The system as it was thus built up and as it existed, the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth and its two branches at Alcatraz and Governors
Island, was to be sharply distinguished from penitentiary servitude. They
were the reform schools of the Army, the primary purpose of which reform
was to fit inmates for honorable restoration to duty with the colors or for
useful employment in civil life. The essentials established of the system of
military penology of the Army were: (1) The indeterminate sentence (effected by means of a suspended sentence of dishonorable discharge, remission
of the unexecuted portion of the sentence of confinement, and restoration to
duty or permission to re-enlist) ; (2) Fitting men for restoration by training
them and stimulating their self-respect through-(a) Military training and
instruction in the disciplinary battalion. (b) Taking them out of prison garb,
and putting them in uniform; not calling them "convicts"; giving them the
privilege of the military salute; treating them as soldiers under intensive
military training. (c) Industrial as well as military training; all tending to
stimulate the soldier's self-respect, and a sense of his own value, and giving
him an opportunity for greater usefulness in his organization, and to earn
more money upon return to civil life, and become a better citizen. (3) The
parole, by which the man's fitness for restoration to civil pursuits may be
tested; and (4) Honorable restoration to duty with the colors. \
From the time when Secretary of War Garrison approved the scheme,
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vested primarily in an administrative officer.2 6 He may have the ad-

vice of the law department, and does.
The purpose of the Disciplinary Barracks is to aid in the restoration of offenders, to make them worthy, good soldiers, and good
citizens. The period that a man is detained in the Barracks lies
within his own hands. The sentences are maximum sentences. Of
course there is authority to hold a man for the entire period for
and transferred the administration of the prisons from The Adjutant General's Department to The Judge Advocate General's Department under General Order No. 56, and placed The Judge Advocate General in charge, until
by the Act of 4 March 1915, by which the control was vested in The Adjutant
General's Department, the men restored to duty completed the terms of their
enlistments with a lower desertion rate than twas made by men who reached
their organizations through the recruit depots by ordinary process of enlistment. Not infrequently they became non-commissioned officers.
The program of restoration from the time of the reform through the
World War is noteworthy. Ignoring the re-enlistments, which were considerable in number, and dealing only with restorations, the following is the
record of the men restored to duty from the disciplinary barracks and its
branches for the years 1914 to 1919 inclusive: Fiscal year 1914, 39; 1915, 139;
1916, 193; 1917, 436; 1918, 678; 1919, 1,417; total, 2,902. 2,448 men were restored to duty between 6 April 1917 and 21 August 1919. The average sentence
in years actually served by these men so restored was less than six months,
or 0.49 of a year. Two thousand four hundred and forty-eight men restored
served less than six months (average) in the disciplinary barracks. Within
this average, the prison commandant and his officers had adjudged that their
reformation was so complete as to justify their being restored to duty with
the colors. The average sentence of three and one-half years was served by
these men by an average confinement of less than six months. Even some of
the men serving even the long-term sentences earned their restoration in less
than six months. The net result of the Army disciplinary barracks administration was that out of 13,593 men passing through the United States Disciplinary Barracks between 1 April 1917, and 31 July 1919 (including 2,101 in confinement on 1 April 1917, and 11,492 sentenced to the Barracks between 1
April 1917, and 31 July 1919), only 3,839 remained in confinement in the various
Barracks on 31 July 1919; being only 1,738 more than were in the Barracks
at the beginning of the war, in spite of the great increase in the Army dulring
the war, and of the number of unfit men of various kinds who were necessarily brought into the service through the operation of the draft.
In France, general prisoners were confined in two camps-at general
intermediate storage depot (Gievres), and at St. Sulpice, near Bordeaux.
Both these camps were under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General,
Services of Supply. On 13 June 1919, that officer was directed to send all
general prisoners to the United States as soon as transportation was available.
On 30 June, there remained in the two camps 108 general prisoners; on 31
July, there were but two. An indeterminate number were en route to the
United States on 31 July 1919, either at Brest, in France, or on the seas.
On 13 August, there were but 12 remaining at Brest.
Although quite a proportion of the sentences to the Disciplinary Barracks
were, nominally, for long terms of years, yet, in fact, the actual sentence served
by the 9,754 men who were released from the Barracks (including the men
restored to the colors) during the period of the war, averaged only 1.06 years.
During the month of August, 1919, the number of men in the Barracks was
further reduced, so that on 30 August 1919, only 3,728 men remained in confinement, or only 1,627 more than at the beginning of the war. Congressional
Record.
2-6Act of 4 March 1915, 10 U. S. C. 1453.
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which, he is sentenced. It is written into the terms of the statute,
authorizing suspension of dishonorable discharge, that these men
are there for the purpose of earning remission of that particular
sentence of imprisonment and dishonorable discharge, and getting
back into the service.2 7 This gives the sentence an indeterminate
character. There is no minimum sentence prescribed by statute.
All sentences are fixed sentences; but, under the operation-of the
law, they may be remitted. For example, a forty-year sentence,
with good conduct, may become a six months sentence. The word
indeterminate does not occur in the Articles of War. From April 6,
1917 to August 31, 1919, at the main branch ofthe Disciplinary
Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, of 1,410 men with an average sentence in years adjudged of 8.8 years, the average sentence
in years actually served was 0.43 of a year. 8
The press reports describe the expanded program in the creation
of the Correction Division within the Office of the Adjutant General
in 1944. This was followed by the superior, policy making, board of
review, the Advisory Board on Clemency in the Office of the Under
Secretary of War, which, in turn, recently was implemented by
five special clemency boards, each exercising review action of particular classes of cases. It is interesting that the general board was
headed on organization by a United States circuit judge, and aided
29

by a justice of a State supreme court.

VIII.
It should be noted in passing that all improvements made within
the Department of Justice for detection, conviction, and punishment
and rehabilitation, as well as those contemplated by the conference
2

7See 10 U. S. C. 1456, 1457b, 1457, 1457a.
2SAnnual Reports.
29
The 17 November 1945 issue of the Army and Navy Journal, Washington, D. C., carries the following comment at 'page 426: "Owen J. Roberts,
former Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, has accepted
appointment as Chairman of the War Department Clemency Board, which
recently began to review the cases of all of the 34,260 military prisoners now
serving general court martial' sentences, with a view to effecting such reduction in sentences as may be warranted on the basis of the individual records
in each case. In announcing the appointment, Under Secretary of War Royall
said: 'The aim of the clemency board is to assure the application of evenhanded justice through the review of sentences adjudged by courts martial
in all parts of the world. The acceptance of the chairmanship by Justice
Roberts will be of extreme assistance in guaranteeing that the highest standards of fairness will be maintained in this post-war review and that clemency
will be granted wherever it is warranted.' In addition to justice Roberts, the
members of the War Department Clemency Board are Austin H. MacCormick, Vice-chairman; Brig. Gen. Rufus S. Ramey, Col. Hubert D. Hoover
and Col. Conrade Snow, with Lt. Col. James P. Hendrick serving as alternate
in the temporary absence of Colonel Snow."
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of Senior Circuit Judges, and by the American Law Institute, either
contemplate or depend upon a select and trained corps of officers
fortified by as complete as possible a body of expert and scientific
data.
The actual reforms, other than inter-department improvements
of personnel, materials and methods, recently effected in this federal
procedural field, include the rules of procedure for*proceedings to
punish for contempt, pursuant to the Act of November 21, 1941;
rules with respect to proceedings after verdict, prepared pursuant
to the Order of the Supreme Court of November 17, 1941; and
the rules with respect to appeals by the Government under the Act
of May 9, 1942. The last two items represent, in a large part, a
proposed revision and expansion of the Rules for Criminal Appeals
adopted by the Supreme Court on May 7, 1934. The Act of February 24, 1933, conferring upon the Supreme Court power to promulgate rules governing criminal appeals, does not require submission
of the rules to the Congress prior to their becoming effective. The
Act of June 29, 1940, which authorized the adoption of rules with
respect to proceedings prior to and including verdict of guilty, and
the act of May 9, 1942, relating to appeals by the government, contain such requirement. There are also pending proposed rules on
the selection of jurors which contemplate uniformity in the
method of selection both as to civil and criminal cases in the
federal courts. A preliminary draft of proposed rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure with respect to proceedings prior
to and including verdict or finding of guilty prepared pursuant to
the Order of the Supreme Court of February 3, 1941, was submitted to the Supreme Court on May 3, 1943, by the Advisory
Committee. The rules will become effective as above indicated.
NON-MILITARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AMERICAN,
ENGLISH, FRENCH

In much of our contemporary literature excoriating the "technical" nature of criminal procedure and stressing the need for
"simplification," procedural rules are held out as the principal reason for miscarriages of justice and ineffectiveness of administration. It constantly has been asserted by an influential school of institutional commentators that the defects of criminal law administration in the United States are due in large part to our failure to
"adapt" eighteenth century English institutions to modern conditions. A variation of this "failure to adapt" thesis was voiced by
Mr. Pierre Crabites, formerly American Judge of the Mixed
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Tribunal at Cairo, Egypt. 30 Trial by jury in criminal prosecutions
in this country does not work, he writes, because the American
Juror, instinctively sympathizing with the "underdog" defendant
and fiercely resenting the "rules of the game," will vote for a verdict
of acquittal in apparent defiance of the evidence. "He may not
know it," writes Judge Crabites, "but his subconscious sympathy
goes out to the prisoner. He frets when the district attorney attempts to lord it over the accused. It makes his blood boil when he
learns what an indictment really is, and what a grand jury typifies.
He does not picture the trial judge as an oracle with a message
from the Almighty..His rebellious instinct makes him prone to
acquit because his inner consciousness is arrayed against what he
considers the insolence of authority." And what is still more important, he feels that the man who is in jeopardy is of his own
flesh and blood, not one of "those people." He looks at the trial
subjectively, not objectively, because "it is his ox that is being
gored." The criminal jury trial works well in England, on the
contrary, because the "caste-ridden" English juror is influenced
by no such subconsious sympathy for the "under-dog." 31 The
object lesson which Judge Crabites draws from his easy assumption
of a wide divergence in psychological attitude between English and
American trial jurors is obvious. Our forebears transplanted on the
shores of "caste-free" America the "roots, of a system of criminal
law that cannot produce healthy fruit when removed from. the
atmosphere of caste." This unfortunate historical blunder "explains why the criminal courts of Britain win the plaudits of the
world and why the finger of scorn is pointed at ours." Our benighted eighteenth century English institutions consequently must
be made over in order to make them square with our prevailing
3OWhy American Criminal Justice Is a Failure, 23 A. B. A. Jour. 697
(1937).
31
"The English juror," says Judge Crabites, "with his water-tight compartment type of mind, with his brain a congeries of caste cells, considers
himself a superior being appointed of the Lord and designed by a Wise Providence as a gracious sovereign to pass upon the guilt or innocence of 'these
people.' They are not of his world. They mean nothing to him. He looks at
the matter objectively, not subjectively. He is of another sphere than those
who are passed in review before him. Moreover, he is absolutely dominated
by another infinitely superior being, the trial judge. If the English juror
considers himself as a being of a different caste from the prisoner at the bar
he knows that the judge belongs to a still higher caste. This recognition gives
the latter a moral ascendancy over the jury that no American judge can
possibly have in the United States. The result is that when the English Bench
makes its final summing up of the evidence and charges the jury, it is
addressing wax discs that caste has made impressionable. In a word, there
are thirteen on the British jury, the thirteenth, the judge, incarnates its lawfinding, its fact-finding, its sentence giving attributes."
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and cherished concepts of social equality and political democracy. 2
Judge Crabites makes no specific recommendations, and disclaims any thought of favoring the introduction of Continental
jurisprudence into the United States, but it may be gathered from
his animated and appreciative discussion of French criminal procedure, and his comparison of it with English and American methods to the vast disadvantage of the latter, that he would abolish the
grand jury and its bill of indictment, curb the functions of the
prosecuting attorney, introduce some form of secret and inquisitorial preliminary examination presided over by a magistrate
analogous to the French juge d'instruction, wipe out the "hypocritical" presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, subject the prisoner
to a rigorous examination by the trial judge, restrict the right of
cross examination by counsel on both sides, but allow defense
counsel the right to make the concluding address to the jury.
It is certain that many devices and techniques utilized in Continental procedure are at hopeless variance with the juristic ideals
of Anglo-American countries. But it does not follow that life and
property are necessarily any more secure in France than in England,
or in turn, than in America. The basic differences between American and English jury trials lie in the independence of the prosecutor
of the court, the greater authority of the judge during the trial, and
in summing-up. The independence of the prosecutor is peculiarly
American, and without some counter-balancing factor, perhaps
Judge Crabites' point is well taken. Such factors are suggested by
the proposed office of public defender, and in the American Law
Institutes Youth Court Act's "presenting attorney." Counsel representing the Crown are, on the whole, much less partisan in their
methods than are our prosecuting attorneys. The fact that in England all prosecutions during the single term of court may be conducted by different counsel, or that the same barristers may appear
for the Crown in some'cases and for the defense in others, is of
great importance. It is, moreover, a consideration often lost sight
32"What I say," Judge Crabites concludes, "is that our criminal procedures should be amended in such a manner that American jurors will be convinced that the accused has had a fair deal, that they will not convict when
they feel in their hearts that the cards are stacked against him. It is because
Americans challenge the rules of the game, when they consider them arbitrary and unfair, that they acquit in many cases where Englishmen would
convict. If we are dissatisfied with present conditions these rules of the game
should be changed. They never will be as long as we live in a fool's paradise
that the common-law is perfect and that because it gives the English the type
of justice they want, it should necessarily be workable in this country."
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of by institutional critics who undertake to contrast law administration in the two countries. The English judge is made responsible
for the trial and its conduct, and thus his supervision and impartial
examination of witness to probe the truth of the issue appears
affirmatively. Our federal judges apparently are becoming more
active in this aspect of administration and in the public interest.
Elective state judges are most reluctant to "spoil a lawyer's case"
by driving to the core of the thing, preferring to remain silent umpires until stimulated to rulings by either of the adversaries, who,
too often, appear to the public as the lawyers. The outstanding difference in the effectiveness of the English court in criminal cases is
the uncomplimentary difference in comparable capacity and character of the judicial personnel. As long as our judges are to be
elected for biennia or little more by their skill on the stump, and not
on the bench, the less they participate in the trial perhaps the better
3
the trial-and the more pathetic the system.1
THE SUMMARY

JURISDICTION MOVEMENT

There is one feature of the English criminal, non-military proceddire which bears peculiar analogy to the military practice. The
recent and phenomenal rise of summary jurisdiction in England is
another factor which distinguishes the civil criminal process in the
two countries. The tendency in Parliament within recent years to
enlarge the powers of courts of summary jurisdiction to hear and
,determine indictable offenses is the most important development in
the administration of English criminal justice during the last halfcentury. It has resulted in the virtual obsolescence of the criminal
jury in the country that gave it origin some six hundred years ago,
and that nurtured it through centuries of social strife and institutional charge. In England, during the year 1933, not less than
61,264 defendants charged with indictable offenses were dealt with
in courts of summary jurisdiction, leaving only 9,201 to be committed for jury trial in the higher courts. It is significant that most
of the cases disposed of summarily did not result from petty infractions of the criminal law, but were prosecutions of grave offenses
which, in most jurisdictions of the United States, would be dealt
with by juries. The statistics will be more easily understood if it is
borne in mind that the old common law distinction between felonies
and midemeanors is no longer of any vital significance in England.
Crimes are classified as indictable and non-indictable, a practical
33

See in general, Howard, Criminal Justice in England (1931).
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distinction based upon the mode of trial. Non-indictable, or minor
offenses are tried in the great majority of the cities and counties by
benches composed of lay justices of the peace. In London and a few
of the larger cities, the same types of cases are tried by professional
police-court magistrates. These non-indictable cases, being tried
without juries, are said to be dealt with summarily; the hearings are
called summary trials, and the courts themselves are referred to as
courts of summary jurisdiction. Indictable cases, on the other hand,
may be subdivided into two classes-crimes of the utmost gravity,
such as murder and manslaughter, which the law still requires must
be tried before juries, and the large and constantly growing number of important offenses referred to above that may now be dealt
with summarily, providing the prisoner waives his right to jury
trial, and the bench of justices before whom the matter is pending
considers such disposition expedient.3 4 The Criminal Justice Act
of 192535 which set up a new and enlarged schedule of indictable
offenses triable summarily, and simplified the whole mode of procedure, resulted in a large part from a recognition by Parliament
of the efficient manner in which courts of summary jurisdiction
dealt with a large body of offenses created during a period of war
emergency-offenses which a half-century ago unquestionably
would have been reserved for jury trial. It is probable that the function of summary jurisdiction will be increased. A commentator in
an English law review referred to the Criminal Justice Act as
"simply another long step on the road toward the replacement of
the jury by the justice."3
The jury trial is not the only time-honored institution which
recently has undergone depreciation in England. The grand jury
which Judge Crabites says "shocks the French mentality," and is
regarded by that nation as a "relic of barbarism and blot upon our
vaunted civilization," was abolished by statute in 1933. 37 For many
years it had done little more than ratify committals for trial by
examining magistrates.
While the province of the criminal jury has been encroached
upon recently in the United States as well as in England, the development has been made possible in the federal courts by judicial
decision. The basic difference in the two types of non-jury trials
34See Howard, The Rise of Summary Jurisdiction in Criminal Law Administration, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 486 (1931) ; Criminal Statistics, 105-7v (1933).
3515 & 16 Geo. V. C. 86.
36161 Law Times 91 (1926).
37Administration of Justice Act, 1933, 22 and 23 Geo. V. C. 36, s. 2. See
Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jury in England, 25 Jour. of Crim. Law and
Criminology, 623 (1934).
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used in the two countries lies in the fact that, in the United States,
the trial is conducted by a judge of the higher criminal court rather
than by justices of the peace or a police-court magistrate. Further
inroads on the jury in this country have resulted from the widespread practice of accepting pleas of guilty, and from the frequent
use of the nolle prosequi, and other modes of ending prosecutions.
A trial for a felony in the federal courts may be had without a
jury, but "the consent of government counsel and the sanction of
the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant."38 Under the specific provisions of state
constitutions for trial by jury, the holdings of state courts are at
variance as to whether, without or with a statute purporting, to so
authorize, a state court may try a person accused of a felony without a jury at his option. A few state constitutions expressly permit
waiver. 39 The Judges Bill discussed above in connection with the
Federal Corrections Act makes provision for extensive use of summary jurisdiction. It will be important to note what Congress does
with the proposals.
THE THEORY OF PLEADING UNDER THE COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM
We already have noted that most of our contemporary literature
dealing with the civil criminal law abuses the "technical" nature of
criminal procedure; and stresses the need for "simplification," holding out procedural rules as the principal, if not the sole, reason for
miscarriages of justice and ineffectiveness of administration. Little
heed is given to the bafflirg complexity of the problem of crime or
to its causes. The widely publicized results of what has been
euphemistically called "the sporting theory of justice" are the stock
in trade of every college debater and journalistic analyst, and are
usually assumed without argument; interminable delays and continuances, cumbersome grand juries, long trials, appeals on obsolete
doctrinal points, and the like. Proposed reforms have included
simpilification of indictment or information, regulation of bail bond,
rendition of jury verdicts by five-sixths (or some less than unanimous proportion), new rules to speed-up appellate procedure, enlarged judicial control of the trial, waiver of the jury trial by the
defendant, judicial control of the selection of the jury, new rules
relating to the insanity defense, and more stringent regulation per38(1930) Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed.
854. 3See Rule 21 of the pending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
9See Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by jury in Criminal Cages, 25 Mich.
L. Rev. 695 (1927) ; and Goldberg, Waiver of Jury in Felony Trials, 28 Mich.
L. Rev. 163 (1929).
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taining to probation, pardon, and parole. We shall consider the
sources of crime under military law as an occasion to discuss the
substantive law and the theory of command and discipline. The
various phases of military procedure will come up in sequence.
Primary is the theory of pleading.
Those who feel alarm or suspicion of the law and procedure of
Army court-martial practices fail to realize that the system is statutory-statutes of the United States. It is a correlated single code of
law and procedure emanating from the popular representative
system, and kept by it under more vigilant supervision and inquiry
than perhaps any other statutory body or code.
We have noticed that the great reforms now pending in the federal civil criminal law are being solved by giving to the head of the
judicial system, namely the Supreme Court of the United States,
rule-making power. That was done at the outset in regard to equity
and admiralty, and recently has been greatly extended. The rulemaking power was extended to the head of the system of military
justice, namely, the President of the United States, by the 38th
Article of War in 1916. 40Pursuant to the authorization by the Congress, the President, from time to time, has published the rules of
court-martial, or military criminal procedure and practice in the
Manual for Courts-Martial. The statute provides that the rules made
pursuant thereto "shall be laid before Congress annually." The
function and opportunity of legislative audit are retained in continuous supervision. The new sets of federal civil rules were submitted initially to the Congress. 4' In approaching the problem it
4010 U.S.C. 1509.
-'The established construction of the President becomes the expression
of the legislative will. This situation was averted to in (1940) Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 14, 61 S. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479, wherein, on a similar
matter of construction, the Supreme Court, after referring to the change in
policy leading to the promulgation of the new rules of civil procedure stated:
"The challenged rules comport with this policy. Moreover, in
accordance with the Act, the rules were submitted to the Congress
so that that body might examine them and veto their going into effect
if contrary to the policy of the legislation. The value of the reservation
of the power to examine proposed rules, laws and regulations before
they become effective is well understood by Congress. It is frequently
as here, employed to make sure that the action under the delegation
squares with the Congressional purpose. Evidently the Congress felt
the rule was within the ambit of the statute as no effort was made to
eliminate it from the proposed body of rules, although this specific
rule was attacked and defended before the committees of the two
Houses. * * * That no adverse action was taken by Congress indi-

cates, at least, that no transgression of legislative policy was found."
See also (1941) U. S. v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 767,
85 L. Ed. 1058.
The appended note to the above quotation indicates that the Supreme Court
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should be borne in mind that, contrary to popular belief, the code
of criminal law and procedure set out in the Manual for CourtsMartial is one of the most enlightened and free from justicedefeating technicalities of any under any American authority. One
of the principal bases for this is found in the fundamentally sound
and fair pervading thesis of notice pleading. Simplicity and fairness
are the dominant characteristics. The blight of justice defeating
technicalities was abated by the Congress through Article of War
37.42 As provided in the above article, the charge and specification
in issue must specify or allege an act upon which the accused has
been tried which constitutes an offense denounced and made punishable within the jurisdiction of the trial court-martial. This in the
simple requirement that the pleading must state a cause of action.
The theory of notice pleading is the reflection of the fundamental
concept of due process of law, namely, that the accused may be
fairly apprised in advance of his trial in order that he be able to
prepare his defense, cross examine intelligently, and marshall his
evidence 'under the issues -involved in his own defense.
One fairly apprised of the substance of the charges against
him cannot reasonably complain because no pre-set, artful expression is used.4 3 The legislative policy of stripping purpose-defeating
technicalities from the courts-martial procedure is followed through
in the promulgated rules in providing: "A plea in abatement is
one that operates to delay the trial, and is based upon some objection to the specification as inartificial, indefinite, or redundant; or
recognized this as a long established practice of the Congress designed to
make sure that the construction given a statute conformed to its intention.
To the same effect is United States v. Tot, (1942) 131 F. (2) 261, 265,
wherein the Court held that a later Act of Congress adopted the interim
administrative construction, which the court said "Congress impliedly confirmed as being cbrrectly interpretative of the legislative intent." See also
Aluminum Co. of America v. U. S., (1941) 123 F. (2) 615, 620.
The rules of military practice and procedure are thus the work of both
elective branches of the government. They are not the cloistered secrets of
an autocratic military tyrant, if there be such a thing; but the public records
of popular government. They are available to all at nominal .cost for the
asking in "A Manual for Courts-Martial United States Army," United States
Government Printing Office, Washington, Price $1 (Buckram).
42
"The proceedings of a court-martial shall not be held invalid, nor the
findings or sentence disapproved in any case on the ground of improper admission or rejection of evidence or for any error as to any matter of pleading
or procedure unless in the opinion of the reviewing or confirming authority,
after an examination of the entire proceedings, it shall appear that the error
complained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of the accused:
Provided, that the act or omission upon which the accused has been tried
constitutes an offense denounced and made punishable by one or more of
these articles . . ." (i0 U.S.C. 1508).
4
3This is a major goal of the pending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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as a misnaming of the accused; or as containing insufficient allegations of time or place. If the plea is sustained the court will, according to the circumstances, either direct that the specification be
stricken out and disregarded or permit the specification to be
amended so as to obviate the objection."44 Under "motion to strike
out," it provides: "By this motion the accused may object to the
sufficiency of a specification on the ground that it does not state
any crime or offense; or that, because of some substantial defect,
the accused is actually prevented from making a proper plea or defense, for example, that it does not fairly apprise the accused of the
offense intended to be charged.

' 45

The element of fairness can find

balance within the purpose of the function of government only
when the interests of both sides, those of the people as a whole on
the one hand and those of the accused on the other, are equated. The
Manual for Courts-Martial further provides, "If a specification,
while defective, is nevertheless sufficient fairly to apprise the accused of the offense intended to be charged, the court, upon the defect being brought to its attention, will, according to circumstances,
direct the specification to be stricken out and disregarded, or continue the case to allow the trial judge advocate to apply . . . for
directions . . . or permit the specification to be so amended as to

cure the defect, and continue the case for such time as in the opinion
of the court may suffice the accused properly to prepare his defense
in view of the amendment. The court may proceed immediately with
the trial

. . .

if it clearly appears ...

that the accused has not in fact

been misled in the preparation of his defense and that a continuance
is not necessary for the protection of his substantial rights." 4 If the
pleading is basically fair upon the facts and free from any substantial element of surprise, the court may proceed with the trial. It
should be noted that the force of Article of War 37 is not spent
when the court has reached its findings, but pervades the entire
procedure on appeal and review with the affirmative duty imposed
upon the reviewing and confirming authorities to assure that no
substantial rights of the accused are prejudiced adversely in any
material manner. This duty attaches automatically to the case
without danger of waiver, as occurs in a civil case, through some
47
failure on his part to plead specially on appeal.
44MCM, page 51.

451d., page 56.
461d., page 73.
47
This affirmative duty in appellate review under the Army system
through the Articles of War to protect the accused is almost wholly foreigr
to the civil tribunals.
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The above discussion has been concerned with the form of the
allegation of the facts constituting the alleged misconduct of the
accused. The rules for the establishment of the alleged facts to the
court-martial are tied to safe standards within the public policy
pronounced by the Congress through the Articles of War. The
38th Article makes the "rules of evidence generally recognized in
the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the United States,"
in so far as practicable, the rules to be applied by the courts-martial,
"Provided, that nothing contrary to or inconsistent with these
articles shall be so prescribed" by the President under his rule
making power.48 The 37th Article is the Article which controls procedure, and appears as the one within the policy of which nothing
inconsistent must be done. The caution of the 38th Article is only
to assure fairness through the concept of judicial pattern tested by
the wisdom of successive ages as the due process of law.
TRAL PRACTICES COMPARED

A brief parallel of the safeguards surrounding the court-martial
procedure with the civil practice is helpful at this point. Under the
civil practice, the prefetring of charges is left exclusively to the
prosecutor's unsupervised discretion. It is very well to say that he
is subject to impeachment, that the charges must state a cause of
action, or even that a grand jury must cooperate or that a committing magistrate must confirm. The concurrence of the grand
jury where one exists (now in probably less than one-third of the
states), or of the magistrate, has been demonstrated to be pro
forma. Attacks upon the charges cannot go beyond their sufficiency
upon their face. Only an unskilled draftsman subjects his pleading
to successful attack from such a quart~r. A peculiar factor of personal interest, not necessarily consistent with his oath-bound duty,
begins to confront the district attorney. The, opportunity for fame
and fortune begins to press upon him as a quasi bribe. Of course
we do not condemn the character of civil prosecutors generally or
specially-that is not the point. We have seen many persons rise
to high places upon the ladder of the prosecution of sensational
cases or many prosecutions and convictions. Where the convicting
evidence is not objective, there is temptation to assure it. Police
third degree-methods, and an unobservable degree of machination
may be enough to bring the case to trial, and perhaps convict. It
must be borne in mind that the civil prosecutor, exercising inde41Cf. supra Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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pendent office, controls, without accountability or check, the whole
process from preferring of charges until the case is finally closed.
The likelihood of bribes from private sources not to prosecute is
not wholly remote nor improbable. The latter type arises on occasion, and is more readily rejectable through character resistance
than is the ever present pressure of glory through his public record
as a prosecutor.
With the military, none of the invitations to misconduct just
described can exist. While it might be possible that the officer who
conducts the trial should also have preferred the charges, it is
rarely true. It is a disapproved practice. But even if he were the
one who preferred the charges, he does not control the decision of
whether or not the charges should be brought to trial. Running the
ordinary pattern, the charges will be presented to the regimental
commander of the accused person. He is wholly independent of the
person preferring the charges. He has an interest, but his interest
is as the commanding officer of the accused. The accused is one
of his men, and it is from his organization that the man will be
taken if the trial occurs. The regimental commander's judgment is
called for twice under the military procedure. First when the charges
are presented to him. True, that at this point he frequently will not
have much information either way in regard to the case, but he
does have to decide upon further action, and has great power to
cause palpably unjustified charges to be withdrawn, and frequently
does. If the charges are referred for investigation, they go to an
impartial investigator who must examine all of the available evidence in the presence of the accused, and return the charges with
his recommendations. The regimental commander again must exercise his judgment by expressing himself on whether the accused
should be brought to trial, and how. When the charges go forward,
they will be presented to the officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction, often the division commander. Again we have an
authority completely independent of the person preferring the
charges, and who has some direct interest in seeing that unfounded charges do not go to trial. Before the division commander
exercises his judgment on the question of whether the charges
should go to trial, he must have received and studied the opinion
of an expert in military law, a lawyer usually also trained in the
civil law, his staff judge advocate.4 9 The division commander has

complete power to reject the charges, or control designation of the
court to which they may be referred.
49MCM, page 26, cf. 10 U. S. C. 1517.
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Let us now look at the civil case again. Examples are legion
that the best qualified members of the community to understand
the complicated, technical machinery and practices of the civil criminal trial do not sit on juries. The better educated, or abler merchafits, business men, lawyers, physicians, ministers, educators,
etc., are either excluded or excused because they are "too busy" to
bother with matters so unimportant to them. With the military, on
the other hand, only those whose position and duties demonstrate
the highest qualifications for the task are eligible to sit in judgment
on the question of guilt. And in the military service, the service
upon a court-martial is given first precedence and the highest sense
of obligation. With the civil prosecutor reaching, inescapably, for
the prestige of conviction, go a superior knowledge and a bag of
tricks of the trade unknown to the jurors who pass upon (sometimes the art of the prosecutor) the question of the guilt of the accused. With the military court, the triers of fact are familiar with
the procedure and the rules of trial. They are also usually of the
organization of the accused, and they should recognize that only
when his rights are protected is their interest as officers served.
The same is true of any attempts to confuse and mislead, artfully
presented by the defense. Let us suppose that in the civil process
a panel of the rhembers of the bar was available for jury service,
from which thirteen members were designated by higher, impartial
authority to serve on the jury without pay: Would the prosecutor
(or the defense counsel) profit by the tricks of the trade designed
to confuse ignorant jurors and becloud the issues? Would counsel
not be compelled to press to the elementary truth for success on
either side?
With the court itself, as distinguished from the fact determining feature of the trial, we have a basis for comparison between
the civil and the military trial in terms of the protection of the accused. Commonly, the trial judge acts and rules in civil criminal
causes only when forced to do so by an affirmative act of the defendant's counsel. The military court stands charged to the Government to affirmatively conduct the trial fairly. It may call for a
witness, examine witnesses (perhaps a civil court also lhas the
power, but, if so, it does not know or use it) and, if material prejudice has arisen through whatever cause, as a matter of fairness to
the .substantial rights of the accused, to raise the matter on its own
initiative, and take the proper action thereunder. Perhaps no phase
of the whole military procedure so clearly represents the proper
balance of the duty of the officer-member of the court to the accused
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on the one hand and the government and people on the other, than
his inherent duty, as a member of the court-martial, to speak out if
the interests of command or the man on trial are improperly jeopardized by any substantial error or misconduct. Because the civil
judge sits as an umpire to act only when stimulated by counsel for
the defense, on the theory that rights not affirmatively claimed are
lost, the accused in the civil courts does not have as full.a degree
of protection of his innocence as does the accused before the courtmartial. Further, the accused before the general court-martial has
no hazard of loss of rights through failure of formal objections and
exceptions. Nor has he any problem or expense in preparing notice
of appeal and record on appeal, or the hazards of motions to dismiss. For time beyond interest, the military trial record has been
complete, without cost to the accused, and automatic. In the civil
courts of the United States, the defendant hired a reporter at his
own expense, and many cases were not reported at all because of
their poverty. Since January 20, 1944, provision has been made for
verbatim records by an official reporter. But the defendant still
has the cost and the burden of proving his innocence on appeal.
The verbatim record and allied papers of the military court go up
automatically as a brief in behalf of the accused without motion
or cost to himself; and, in addition thereto, a carbon copy of the
record of trial is made for him without cost whether or not he requests a copy. 0
Again we note a ground for comparison on basic fairness in seeking the truth. The trial concluded, execution will follow sentence
in the civil courts unless the accused, at his own expense, carries
an appeal. On the appeal, he will be heard only upon the points of
error he affirmatively asserts, and of them only those he did not
waive through failure to object on trial, and now presents in the
proper, formal pleading. Under the military procedure, the appeal
is automatic, without expense, and upon everything in the record.
We already have noted the language of Article of War 37 under
which the Congress commanded reviewing and confirming authorities to recognize any error which has injuriously affected the
substantial rights of the accused, and to take appropriate action for
his protection and relief. In all cases before generaf courts-martial,
the record of trial must be examined in the office of The Judge
Advocate General."' Only if the trial is found to have been conducted fairly and free of any error which injuriously affected the
010 U. S. C. 1504, 1506, 1517 to 1522 incl., and 1583.
r'A. W. 50%, 10 U. S. C. 1522.
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substantial rights of the accused will the record of trial be held
to be legally sufficient to support the findings of guilty and the
sentence. The affirmative duty on review to protect the rights of the
accused, which is imposed by law, is the reason the accused need not
appear by counsel, although he is privileged to be heard by counsel
before the reviewing bodies.
In passing, we did not note, by way of comparison, that one of
the most outstanding'procedural reforms in recent years in the civil
courts has been the pre-trial investigation. Nowhere in the civil
criminal procedure, is the accused entitled to appear of record in
pre-trial action, to have all witnesses against him examined in his
presence, and subjected to his cross-examination; and to have compulsory process to compel witnesses in his own behalf to be presented. These he has in the procedure under Article of War 70, and
52
in his company and regimental commanders' theater of action.
Nowhere under the mandate of Congress, through the Articles
of War, does the accused have less protection of his rights upon
the merits of the case before a court-martial than he does before the'
federal courts. In many ways his safeguards are far more real
and factual. At no point in the military procedure does any person
stand to capitalize upon the fiisfortune or conviction of the accused. This is not always true of the civil criminal prosecution.

THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
When we examine the court-martial we see that every proposed
reform applied by responsible authority to improve the administration of criminal justice in civil cases has been anticipated or adopted
into the system of military justice. All of those suggestions sum up
to the fundamental postulates of simplicity, fairness, and expedition without haste.53 In the first place all potentiality of personal
52
Under the pending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a pre-trial
procedure on a voluntary basis is suggested. See 10 U. S. C. 1542. The protective equivalent of the indictment procedure is secured to the accused
before the charges are approved. Thereafter, the Congress has given the
soldier the additional protection of the 107th Article, the completeness of
which is the substance of a pre-trial hearing. Neither is essential to a due
process trial. However, although no initial constitutional right is involved,
the possibility of a statutory right is peculiar in tribunals which, like courtsmartial, are wholly statutory. See 10 U. S. C. 1579.
53
When the rules of the American Law Institute and the later pending
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are examined in integration, one cannot fail to feel that if they are not patterned upon the procedure of the Manual
for Courts-Martial the coincidence is even more surprising. Of the pending
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the following are the objective and
achievement. They introduce into the federal civil courts uniformity and simplicity in criminal procedure. A simple form of indictment supplants the
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gain or profit is excluded from the preference of charges which must
be verified under oath after investigation or knowledge by observation, as well as from all subsequent stages of the cause. The pleadings are non-technical, simple, and devoid of surprise. The purpose
of the investigation is to prevent trials where either the evidence is
deficient or the purpose of military discipline can be better served
by alternative measures under the 104th Article of War.5 4 The
interest of the commanding officers is to keep their men, whenever
possible, on duty with their organization, 'on the theory that a
soldier's place is in the ranks and not in the guardhouse.
The court itself is selected from men of comparatively superior
training and ability, and because thereof, more likely to pass on the
issues presented impartially. Even where, because of the rapid
growth of our war-time Army, many members of the court have
not had years of experience in such work, they, nevertheless, carry
with them the intensity of the situation and heightened sense of
war-time duty. Equipped by training, education, and experience
to deal intelligently with the facts under the issues presented, the
members of the court-martial are so far superior to the components
of civil courts constituted to try criminal causes that the comparison
is startling. Indeed, the citizen's conscience may well be shocked
at the comparative incompetency of the civil institutions. By the
same token, the rules of procedure and evidence controlling the
military court are fundamentally superior to those in the civil
courts, if simplicity and fairness to both sides are the proper tests.
However, at this point the merit of military justice begins to
depreciate in comparison. We have seen that the Congress had commanded that the practice, in part, and the rules of evidence rather
largely, of the federal civil courts should control the federal courtmartial. These rules, practices, customs and procedures are the
subject-matter of professional study. Mastery cannot be gained
by a night's gleaning of a manual outline. There can be no assurance of fairness in a procedure controlled by rules of law and judicial tradition unless those rules are applied by those skilled and
learned in their nature and use. The public interest is served only
verbose, prolix document couched in the language of Elizabeth vulgarized
through the centuries to us. And the indictment is supplanted by the information in less than capital cases-waiver of indictment by the defendant being
permitted. The simple motion is substituted for demurrers, pleas in abatement, special pleas in bar and motions to quash. The procedure of removal
is simplified, and the novel feature of motion for change of venue is introduced. And these things, long the substance of the military practice, are
yet of the future to the civil courts of the United States.
5410 U. S. C. 1576.
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when there is assurance that the truth will be disclosed. This brings
us to the greatest weakness in the court-martial system. The outstanding virtue of the civil criminal trial is the judge. For whatever may be said about him not being a better judge among judges,
he is always one trained and skilled in the task he is called upon
to perform as a public servant and officer. It is true that the older
officers of the line, after many years of court-martial experience,
develop a knowledge of the law and procedure of the law military.
In none of our federal agencies is there more call for professional
skill in the public interest than in the court-martial trial. Qualified
experts are needed as trial judge advocate, defense counsel, and
ruling members of the court-martial. By analogy, American experience in the jtldicial process calls for equal professional expertness in knowledge of the law based upon professional training in the
personnel of the law officers of the inferior courts-martial. 55 As a
matter of course, counsel should be heard by both the reviewing and
confirming authorities on the legal sufficiency of the record of trial
to support a sentence, the reasonableness of the sentence, and the
problem of clemency.

6

The parallel development of the civil jurisdiction and the established practices of military justice demonstrates that the courtmartial system is fundamentally sound and fair in terms of American
57

tradition and development.

5
5 A statute would change the requirements, but all could be achieved by
administrative action.
56The additional time required for this is justified. On matters so important, the inter-office advice now provided by the staff judge advocate
should not measure the information assured to the reviewing and confirming

authorities. The reviews of the staff judge advocates, in each instance, should

comprehend the arguments of counsel presented at the hearings before the
reviewing and confirming authorities.
57Sound public administration in the public interest requires that general laws vest adequate power in the office. Good and competent men must
be chosen from experience to administer them. And they, in turn, must be kept
conscious of their obligations as public servants by the duty to make public
frequent audits of their administration. See for full discussion of the administrative function and public interest concept, J. B. Smith, Judicial Function in

Legislative Bodies, (1941) 27 Va. L. Rev. 417, and Jurisprudence and Constitutional Canon Re "To the State and to Congress," (1941) 28 Va. L. Rev.
129. The effort to find balance between statutory minutiae and general discretion is reflected in the substance of a colloquy which I recall at a hearing

of the American Law Institute upon its code provision designed for the latter
effect through simplification and elasticity of the indictment process. To
the protest by the elder jurist, "I'd hate to be indicted under such a scheme,"
the Reporter's parody, "I'd hate to be indicted under any plan," silenced his
alarm.

